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Everywhere in Africa today, the architects of government are building new struc-
tures on political foundations that are traditional as well as modern. Often they appear
to be constructing a new form of government, one that conserves traditional authority as
a political resource without diminishing the authority of the sovereign state. To express
this idea, I borrow a concept from the history of political thought, namely "mixed govern-
ment." In modern Africa, it is normal for traditional political jurisdictions to occupy a
second dimension of political space - a dimension behind the sovereign state; Janus-like,
or back-to-back. The political officials of these "second" states are known generally as
traditional authorities; they hold positions of public trust in accordance with customary
rules, although their appointments and functions are normally regulated by statutory law
as well.
In the history of political thought, the idea of mixed government has appeared in
ancient and in modern times. The ancient form, described by Plato, Aristotle, and Pol-
ybius, involved a mixture of institutions designed to safeguard the rich with other insti-
tutions devised to promote the interests of the poor. Modern forms of mixed govern-
ment, created during the 16th and 17th centuries, such as the Estates-General in France
and "mixed monarchy" in England, united the historic "estates" of society behind sover-
eign nation-states. But in medieval, unlike either ancient or modern, Europe, political
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life was bifurcated, or djalistic, in a manner that has something in common with the
primary political cleavage of modern Africa. Sovereign, unified states did not emerge
throughout Europe until the 16th century. The most common arrangement was coexis-
tence of two self-subsisteut realms of government, at aims length from one another,
known as Princeps and Populus, or King and Kingdom (including judicial and municipal
officials who were independent of the king). The leading political idea of medieval
Europe was "double majesty."'
Heretofore, historians of political thought have used the concept of mixed gov-
ernment with reference to unified, rather than dualistic, political systems. I wish to
suggest that it is particularly relevant to the political structure of modern Africa, specifi-
cally the African pattern of dualistic authority within the framework of unified states. In
Africa, back-to-back domains of authority often govern the same people, or communities
of citizen-subjects. However, the second dimension of "traditional" states-beni"d-the-
state rarely competes with the first dimension for sovereignty, although second dimen-
sional rulers and office holders c >r> exercise immense moral and political authority.
Increasingly, such authority is being recognized in Africa as a potential resource of
great value, for it can help to maintain civic morale and social order during the extremely
difficult transitions that lie ahead. A separate source of political authority, embedded in
tradition, could powerfully reinforce social stability without the abandonment of demo-
cratic reforms. Traditional governments could prove themselves to be superior shock
absorbers for the African ships of state during the stormy passages of these turbulent
times.
Elsewhere I have ideutified the African form of mixed government as a research
"frontier" for political scientists.2 In this paper, I wish to consider the implications of
mixed government for constitutional democracy in the anglophonecountrics of Southern
Africa.
Degrees of Incorporation
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In most African countries, the constitutional powers of traditional rulers are
severely circumscribed. They and their subordinate title-holders perform advisory, cere-
monial, and extra-constitutional functions mainly. For example, in Nigeria, where the
influence of traditional authority is pervasive, the federal constitution declares plainly
that no executive, legislative, or judicial power has been conferred on traditional authori-
ties or councils by those provisions of the constitution that recognize, and thereby legiti-
mate, their existence. With few exceptions, similar patterns of interdimensional authority
obtain throughout eastern, western, and central Africa. However, in southern Africa, the
emerging forms of mixed government are highly variable. The constitutions of Botswana,
Namibia, South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland, in that order, represent a gradation from
marginal to maximal constitutional authority for traditional rulers. I shall consider each
of them ia turn.
In the Republic of Botswana, traditional rulers regularly hold public meetings,
known as dikgoila (plural oikgotla) to discuss proposed public policies which are expect-
ed to have direct local impacts. In this manner, many communities "buy into" legislative
proposals before they become laws. Patrick P. Molutsi and John D. Holm conclude that,
in Botswana, evasion of the political "gauntlet of kgodas... would seriously compromise a
program's legitimacy." Furthermore, they find, "some policies have gone through numer-
ous reformulations because they could not pass muster in kgoila when it came to imple-
mentation."' Chief Linchwe II, a leading practitioner of modernized and socially-re-
sponsible traditional authority in Botswana, has justified its perpetuation thus: "Botswana
needs to build a political structure in which the Westminster-type of [parliamentary]
government and our traditional government coexist for the preservation and develop-
ment of our unique form of democracy."4
Dikgotla are strictly extra-constitutional agencies of government. Insofar as they
participate in the formation and implementation of public policies, the traditional rulers
of the Tswana people complement constitutional office-holders without infringing their
legal jurisdictions. They perform governmental functions that are not authorized by the
prescribed constitutional arrangements. A slightly higher degree of incorporation ob-
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tains in the Republic of Namibia, where vast distances separate the traditional home-
lands of diverse peoples. As in South Africa, the traditional political institutions of the
Namibians were severely compromised by colonial rule and, subsequently, the apartheid
regime. This legacy is addressed in the Independence Constitution of 1990, which pro-
hibits the manipulative pr.T '•'' v of "ethnic engineering" and does not provide for the
inclusion of traditional authorities in local government councils. However, the constitu-
tion does establish a national Council of Traditional Leaders, which shall be consulted by
the President on matters relating to the control and utilization of communal land.5
In South Africa, European rulers manipulated African political traditions to
solidify their control of subject populations throughout the colonial, dominion, and
apartheid eras. Since 1927, powers to appoint, recognize, and remove chiefs, and to
compel their service as administrative functionaries, were vested comprehensively in the
head of state -- Governor-General until 1961, thereafter State President until 1994.
"Chiefs who were not amenable to government policies, no matter what traditional legiti-
macy they might enjoy, were ousted from office or passed over in matters of succession.
The result," as T \V. Bennett writes, "was the creation of a compliant cadre of'traditio-
nal' rulers which was to provide the infrastructure for the independent homelands."* Yet
the stigma of its association with apartheid does not appear to have delegitiraated Afri-
can traditional mlership in South Africa to any greater degree than other forms of Euro-
pean domination produced that effect elsewhere in Africa. The norms of traditional
political culture prove to be durable. While they have been modified by the intrusive
forces of imperialism, they have also adapted to the necessity of coexistence with Europe-
an settlers and the conditions of subordination to them.
The current attachment of many South Africans to traditional political values was
indicated by this guideline formulated by the African National Congress (ANC) in 1988:
The institution of hereditary rulers and chiefs shall be transformed to serve
the interests of the people as a whole in conformity with the democratic
principles embodied in the Constitution.7
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In December 1991, a broadly based Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa,
aligned with the ANC, became active in the arena of constitutional politics, as did the
Zulu king, who was aligned with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), an adversary of the
ANC. The constitutional proposals of the IFP called for the recognition of "traditional
rulers and authorities as well as courts."
The "interim" constitution of 1993 provides for the establishment of Houses of
Traditional Leaders by provincial governments. Such bodies, which shall consist "of
representatives elected or nominated" by traditional authorities, shall advise the provin-
cial governments and legislatures on "matters relating to traditional authorities, indige-
nous law or the customs of traditional communities within the province." The Constitu-
tion also establishes a Council of Traditional Leaders, with similar advisory functions, at
the national level; it shall consist of a chairperson and 19 representatives, elected by
members of the provincial Houses of Traditional Leaders. At the level of local govern-
ment, the traditional leaders of communities that observe systems of indigenous law shall
be entitled to ex officio membership in local government bodies in addition to their eligi-
bility for elected office.8
In April 1994, a threatened boycott of South Africa's first non-racial election by
the IFP was narrowly averted by an agreement to amend the interim constitution before
the date of election. The amendments were designed to authorize the establishment of a
constitutional monarchy as the form of government for the province of KwaZulu/Natal.
Thus, section 160 was amended to permit provincial constitutions to "provide for the
institution, role, authority and status of a traditional monarch" in the provinces, particu-
larly "for the Zulu Monarch in the case of the province of KwaZulu/Natal."9
The creation of a constitutional monarchy within a sovereign republic, as an inte-
gral part of the constitutional order of that republic, is a striking innovation in modern
constitutional practice. It differs from the standard practice of monarchy within a dualis-
tic polity, which is a normal practice in Africa; for example, the widely heralded restora-
tion of kingship by the Buganda of Uganda in 1993. Although "republican monarchy" is
a constitutional oxymoron, it does also exemplify the constitutional tradition of mixed
5
JUN-27-94 MON !=;:42 UCLB-POL I TICAL SCIENCE
government. The challenge it poses for constitutionalism in South Africa has been de-
scribed by a thoughtful observer thus:
The powers of... a monarchy [such as the constitutional monarch of Kwa-
Zulu/Nalal] would be bounded, to be sure, by both national legislative
competence and the constitutional guarantees of human rights -- but exact-
ly how those limits will interact with possible provincial constitutional pro-
visions dealing with the "institution, role, authority and status of a tradition-
al monarch" remains to be seen.10
We turn to the small mountain kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland, where the
degree of incorporation (of traditional institutions into modern governments) is literally
elevated. The Kingdom of Lesotho is a constitutional monarchy; the constitution pro-
vides that Paramount Chiefs, or their designated representatives, shall occupy two-thirds
of the seats in the Senate, an inferior legislative chamber that is empowered merely to
delay the enactment of bills passed by the elected National Assembly." By contrast,
Swaziland has been governed in an absolutist fashion by a traditional monarch ever since
the late King, Sobhuza II, repealed that country's independence constitution in 1973.
Recent changes signify a gradual return to constitutional monarchy, including multiparty
elections. However, the Swazi King retains executive power, albeit shared with a Prime
Minister appointed by the King, who also appoints two-thirds of the Senate as well as the
judiciary. Furthermore, 40 members (four-fifths) of the House of Assembly are elected
in single member districts that correspond to the nation's 40 tribal councils (Tinkhundla);
10 additional members are appointed by the King.12
Swaziland represents an exception to the normal pattern of subordinate status for
traditional rulers who have been incorporated into the constitutional systems of sover-
eign states. Does the capture of sovereign authority by a traditional ruler negate the very
idea of dual authority? Not to my mind. Each dimension (the sovereign and the tradi-
tional) of the African mixed state exists in its own right; each has an independentfounda-
tion in the structure of society. Each does routinely encroach upon the other's domain
and incorporate elements of it; but neither can extinguish the other during the current
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era. Should tbe heavens fall on a sovereign entity and destroy it, or cause it to be aquired
by another sovereign power, traditional authority would still continue to exist in that
country's second dimension of political space.
Constitutional Implications
It is important to distinguish between the concepts of mixed government and dual
authority. Mixed government implies cooperative interaction among distinct and rela-
tively autonomous governmental institutions, each of which is rooted securely in the
"estates" (or functional interest groups) of society. Dual authority, on the other hand,
implies an arms-length relationship betwen parallel governments, which may, or may not,
function harmoniously regardless of the fact that their operations are inter-related.
When the concept of mixed government is applied to situations of dual authority, it
accentuates the premise of mutual accommodation relative to that of institutional con-
flict.
In African studies, most political scientists have been wary of the intellectual trap
that spuriously pits modernity against tradition. For this reason, I think, they have shied
away from the ambiguous concept of dual authority. Yet there is a classic study of politi-
cal dualism in Africa, The Politics of Tradition by C. S. Whitaker," that avoids the pit-
falls of both incompatibility and simple linear change from tradition to modernity. I have
adopted his conception of a durable symbiotic relationship between parallel authorities,
and render it typologically as mixed government.14
In anthropologicalthought.dual authority is frequently, and logically, represented
as an adversarial relationship. Thus Gordon R. Woodman, following Sally Falk Moore,
discerns a direct, causal relationship between the "weakness of the state" and the relative
strength of those indigenous laws that regulate non-state "semi-autonomous social
fields."15 While I am persuaded by Woodman's argument for the application of "a legal-
ly pluralist paradigm" to constitutional studies, I do not think it should ordain a theorem
of incompatibility between the component systems of law. The main premise of mixed
JUN-2V-94 MOM 1SI4S UCL l=< — POL I T I'C A.L SCIEMCI
government is not antagonistic conflict among the constituent elements, but systemic
complementarity.
Power in society cannot be compartmentalized by the analytical boundaries of
coexisting realms of authority. Indeed, mixed government entails the existence of sys-
tematic linkages between the sovereign and the "second" states. Incorporation is a form
of linkage involving the transfer of authority from one dimension to another, as in the
establishment of a constitutional monarchy in KwaZulu/Natal, or the reservation of
places in a legislative chamber for traditional rulers. The formal appointment of tradi-
tional authorities by heads of government, or their bureaucratic subordinates, is also a
form of incorporation. But it remains the case that traditional legitimacy does not derive
from the act of appointment. "Pretenders" to a throne and other dubious occupants of
traditional Office have often been rejected and ostracized by their communities when the
method of appointment has been unacceptable. In brief, traditional authorities will not
become legitimate merely by virtue of their appointments; on the contrary, they are
appointed because the office itself is, or has been, or is becoming, legitimate.
Perhaps the most important interdimensional linkage in African mixed govern-
ments is the system of justice, including courts and the law. Court systems, both statutory
and customary, function to maintain the integrity of their respective dimensions of the
law. When conflicts of law arise, members of the judiciary are called upon to resolve
disputes involving indigenous customary law, including the rules of succession to a
throne. Since the judicial establishments are relied upon to link the two dimensions of
government, and regulate their relations, judicial independence is crucial to the vitality of
mixed government. This structural requisite of viable mixed government is also a prime
condition for the development of constitutional government in Africa. It portends a far
brighter future for the cause of liberty under law in Africa than pessimists, who cite the
fragility of governments in a multitude of newly independent states, are able to dis-
cern."
The existence of a multitude of vibrant "second" dimensions of political authority,
organized by traditional rulers, their councillors, and customary courts, should not be
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idealized as a continental school for democracy. However, the African bedrock of tradi-
tional political identity could prove to be a relatively stable foundation of political order
upon which to construct new and experimental governments, including constitutional
democracies. Conversely, the second dimensions will surely change in response to the
influence of democratic thought and practice in the sovereign states. Thus, in the new
South Africa, "traditional leaders" have organized to "protect and promote the institution
ofchiefiainship"byharmonizingtheir interests with popular"aspirations for a democratic
society."17 Many leaders of the "second" states are pro6cient in the arts of coexistence
with sovereign overlords. Their authority can be expected to persist for as long as the
ramparts of their domains are secured by a goodly Dumber of faithful guardians.
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